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REIMAGINING INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW 
TIM STEPHENS∗
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Scientists increasingly refer to the current epoch as the “anthro-
pocene” because of the many ways human hands have transformed 
the natural world.1  Human activities have touched virtually all land-
scapes on earth, driven many organisms to extinction, and changed 
the composition of the atmosphere and the chemistry of the oceans.2  
They have also had a major impact on water basins,3 “re-plumbing” 
natural waterways to satisfy uses, including agriculture, industry, con-
sumption, transportation, and the reduction of flood risks.  In so 
doing, human activities have fundamentally altered the flow of fresh-
water and changed the flux of sediments between the land and the 
oceans.4  Human-induced climate change looms as the most powerful 
influence on the hydrosphere as a whole and on the small fraction 
(three percent) of the planet’s water that is freshwater.5  Climate 
change is intensifying the hydrological cycle, shifting precipitation 
patterns worldwide, increasing rates of evaporation, the intensity of 
cyclones, and melting glaciers and icecaps.6
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 1. Jan Zalasiewicz et al., The Anthropocene: A New Epoch of Geological Time?, 369 PHIL. 
TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL SOC’Y A 835, 835 (2011); James P.M. Syvitski & Albert Kett-
ner, Sediment Flux and the Anthropocene, 369 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL SOC’Y A 
957, 957 (2011). 
 2. Syvitski & Kettner, supra note 1, at 958–59; Rachel Baird, Meredith Simons & Tim 
Stephens, Ocean Acidification: A Litmus Test for International Law, 4 CARBON AND CLIMATE L. 
REV. 459, 459–61 (2009). 
 3. Syvitski & Kettner, supra note 1, at 958. 
 4. Id. at 958–59, 964–70. 
 5. Earth’s Water Distribution, USGS, http://ga.water.usgs.gov/edu/waterdistribution. 
html (last visited Nov. 11, 2011). 
 6. Syvitski & Kettner, supra note 1, at 958–59; M. G. Sanderson et al., Regional Tempera-
ture and Precipitation Changes Under High-End (≥4˚C) Global Warming, 369 PHIL. 
TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL SOC’Y A 85, 94 (2011). 
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If the extent of these changes seems almost too great to fathom, 
then the idea that international water law could ever be up to the task 
of moderating human influence on the hydrological cycle and satisfy-
ing global water needs in an equitable fashion also appears beyond 
our imagination.  Nonetheless, such a reimagining is not only neces-
sary, but possible.7  International water law has seen significant 
change over the last century, with the law expanding to recognize the 
functions that water plays not only in meeting human needs, but also 
in servicing critical ecosystem functions.8  Yet there is a dimension of 
international water law that remains only partially explored and sig-
nificantly underdeveloped, namely its capacity to realize a fair distri-
bution of freshwater resources on a global scale.9  Considerable 
progress has been made in examining water issues through the lens of 
human rights—an imperative urged upon us by the Millennium De-
velopment Goal that we halve the proportion of the world’s popula-
tion without sustainable access to safe drinking water.10  But there is a 
need to look further and address even more fundamental questions 
surrounding hydrological disadvantage worldwide.11
The seeds of this approach can be found in the “community of 
interest” theory of water management endorsed by the International 
Court of Justice (“ICJ”) in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case.
  
12  Professor 
Stephen C. McCaffrey, one of the International Law Commission’s 
(“ILC”) special rapporteurs on the Law of the Non-Navigational Use 
of International Watercourses, has since extrapolated it.13  McCaffrey 
suggests a radical change for international law: a mechanism to ad-
dress the world’s severe hydrological disadvantages.14
 
 7. See infra Part II. 
  McCaffrey ar-
gues that freshwater resources should be considered the common 
heritage of humankind, given that they are as vital to human exis-
tence as other natural resources that have been classified as global 
commons and subject to international legal regulation (however im-
 8. Malin Falkenmark & Jan Lundqvist, Looming Water Crisis: New Approaches are Inevita-
ble, in HYDROPOLITICS: CONFLICTS OVER WATER AS A DEVELOPMENT CONSTRAINT 178, 179–
80, 185 (Leif Ohlsson ed., 1995). 
 9. Id. at 179. 
 10. Rep. of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, 9, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 
199/20 (Aug. 26–Sept. 4, 2002). 
 11. Falkenmark & Lundqvist, supra note 8, at 179–83. 
 12. Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 7, ¶ 85 
(Sept. 25) (finding that countries sharing a river have a right to equal water access, and 
that no country can unilaterally assume control of a shared water source). 
 13. See STEPHEN C. MCCAFFREY, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES 168 (2d 
ed. 2007) (describing the “community of interest” theory as a good theoretical context 
even though it is not a source of concrete legal rights or obligations). 
 14. Id. at 169.  
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perfect that regulation may be).15  He contends further that if there is 
agreement on this, there should be a mechanism for addressing se-
vere hydrological disadvantages.  This would be a radical change for 
international water law.  Historically, freshwater resources have been 
treated as fixtures in landscapes, belonging exclusively to the individ-
ual states, or groups of states, in which they are found.16  Against the 
backdrop of climatic change that is altering the hydrosphere and ex-
acerbating hydrological inequalities, this Article reprises McCaffrey’s 
argument, assessing the prospects for a reimagined international wa-
ter law, which is based on a new global “water ethic”17
II. THE U.N. WATERCOURSES CONVENTION  
 and which ad-
dresses the freshwater needs of all states. 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses18 (“U.N. Water-
courses Convention”) provides the global architecture for interna-
tional water law.  Based on articles drafted by the ILC, the United Na-
tions General Assembly (the “General Assembly”) adopted the U.N. 
Watercourses Convention in May 1997 by a vote of 106 states in favor 
to just three against.19
Fourteen years have now passed and yet the Convention has still 
not taken effect.
  
20  The Convention has only twenty-four parties, nine 
fewer than the thirty-five required for the Convention to enter into 
force.21  Ratification of the Convention has not only been slow, but it 
has been geographically uneven.  While it has few signatories from 
the Americas, Asia, or Europe, it has attracted a respectable number 
of accessions in Africa and the Middle East, reflecting the priority that 
nations in these regions place on water issues.22
 
 15. Id. at 168–70. 
  Among African states, 
Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Morocco, Namibia, 
Nigeria, South Africa, and Tunisia have all joined the U.N. Water-
 16. Id. at 69–70. 
 17. For an explanation of the need for a new global “water ethic,” see Falkenmark & 
Lundqvist, supra note 8, at 179. 
 18. United Nations: Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of Interna-
tional Watercourses, May 21, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 700 (1997). 
 19. Id. at 700.  Burundi, China, and Turkey voted against the U.N. Watercourses Con-
vention; twenty-seven states abstained.  Id. 
 20. Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 
UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/ 
Volume%20II/Chapter%20XXVII/XXVII-12.en.pdf (last visited Sept. 13, 2011). 
 21. Id.  
 22. Id. 
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courses Convention, as have a number of Middle Eastern states: Iraq, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Qatar, and Syria.23
The U.N. Watercourses Convention was the culmination of over 
twenty years of work by the ILC and the Sixth (Legal) Committee of 
the General Assembly, and is the world’s first universal water agree-
ment.
  
24  It contains thirty-seven provisions divided across seven parts 
and applies only to shared watercourses on the earth’s surface, such as 
rivers or lakes, and not to groundwater resources (unless these are 
connected with a surface water system).25  The most fundamental ob-
ligations under the U.N. Watercourses Convention are found in Part 
II.  Article 5, the opening provision of Part II, requires states sharing a 
watercourse to utilize it equitably and reasonably, taking into account 
relevant factors and circumstances.26  These circumstances include 
geographic considerations, social and economic needs, populations 
dependent on the watercourse, effects on other watercourse states, 
existing and potential uses, and the availability of alternatives.27  The 
U.N. Watercourses Convention further requires that states “take all 
appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant harm to 
other watercourse States.”28  Part III of the U.N. Watercourses Con-
vention contains important obligations relating to prior notification 
of planned measures, such as the construction of a dam that may have 
a significant adverse impact upon other watercourse states.29
Part IV goes beyond the traditional focus of international water 
law; it encourages states’ cooperation in the optimum use of water re-
sources for human needs and imposes obligations on states to protect 
and preserve the ecosystems of international watercourses.
 
30
 
 23. Id. 
  The 
U.N. Watercourses Convention therefore represents an important de-
velopment in international water law in several respects, particularly 
 24. MCCAFFREY, supra note 13, at 359; Salman M. A. Salman, The U.N. Watercourses Con-
vention Ten Years Later: Why Has Its Entry into Force Proven Difficult?, 32 WATER INT’L 1, 1, 13 
(2007), available at http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/bibliography/articles/general/ 
Salman-UNWatercoursesConventionTenYears.pdf. 
 25. United Nations: Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of Interna-
tional Watercourses, supra note 18, art. 1, 2 (explaining that the U.N. Watercourses Con-
vention applies only to international watercourses); see also G.A. Res. 63/124, U.N. Doc 
A/RES/63/124 (Jan. 15, 2009) (addressing transboundary aquifers). 
 26. United Nations: Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of Interna-
tional Watercourses, supra note 18, art. 6. 
 27. Id.  The factors and circumstances listed in Article 6 are indicative rather than ex-
haustive.  Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. art. 12. 
 30. Id. art. 20. 
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in giving this historically utilitarian area of international law a non-
anthropocentric environmental dimension. 
Various reasons have been posited to explain the poor level of ra-
tification of the U.N. Watercourses Convention, including treaty con-
gestion, lack of awareness and capacity, and lack of a “champion.”31  
The most probable explanation for the slow ratification, however, is 
that because the Convention’s core elements reflect customary inter-
national law, states see little benefit in joining the regime.32  As much 
as states have extensively applied the ILC’s Articles on State Responsi-
bility33 in addressing internationally wrongful acts even though they 
are unlikely ever to be transformed into a treaty, the U.N. Water-
courses Convention can be said to have value for its substantive con-
tent rather than its formal legal status.34  This interpretation is sup-
ported by the decision of the ICJ in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case that 
referred approvingly to the U.N. Watercourses Convention just a few 
months after it had been concluded.35
A less charitable view is that the U.N. Watercourses Convention 
offers little to prospective members, as it imposes few concrete obliga-
tions and leaves existing arrangements essentially undisturbed.
  
36  This 
appraisal draws support from a recent ICJ decision, the Pulp Mills 
case, in which the court made no reference to the U.N. Watercourses 
Convention and instead decided the dispute solely by reference to a 
bilateral treaty between the parties.37
 
 31. Alistair Rieu-Clarke & Flavia Rocha Loures, Still Not in Force: Should States Support the 
1997 UN Watercourses Convention?, 18 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY AND INT’L ENVTL. L. 185, 192–
93 (2009). 
  The relationship between the 
U.N. Watercourses Convention and other water agreements on foot 
or to be agreed in the future was a vexed one during the drafting and 
 32. Id. at 193–94. 
 33. Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 53rd sess., Apr. 23–Jun. 1, Jul. 2, 2001–Aug. 10, 
2001, U.N. Doc. A/56/10; GAOR, 56th sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001).   
 34. Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 49th sess., Apr. 23–Jun. 1, Jul. 2, 2001–Aug. 10, 
2001, U.N. Doc. A/49/10; GAOR, 49th sess., Supp. No. 10 (1994). 
 35. Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 7, ¶ 85 
(Sept. 25). 
 36. See United Nations: Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of Inter-
national Watercourses, supra note 18, art. 3(1) (providing that nothing in the U.N. Water-
courses Convention “shall affect the rights or obligations of a watercourse State arising 
from agreements in force for it on the date on which it became a party to the present Con-
vention”). 
 37. Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 1, ¶¶ 1, 47 
(Apr. 20).  Neither Argentina nor Uruguay have signed or ratified the U.N. Watercourses 
Convention, but the parties referred to it in the written pleadings and in oral argument, 
and Judge Cançado Trindade referred to it in his opinion.  See id. at ¶ 60 (separate opi-
nion of Judge Trindade) (discussing the U.N. Watercourses Convention and its impact on 
international environmental protection law).  
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negotiation of the Convention.38  There are more than 260 watersheds 
shared by two or more countries, and there are over 3,000 water-
course treaties in existence.39  This latter fact was one reason cited by 
Egypt and other states as to why the Convention must apply subject to 
the existing leges speciales rather than override them.40  Indeed, the di-
versity in the governance of river basins worldwide is very significant, 
with some relying on more formal and “harder” legal regimes, while 
others depend on “softer” forms of regulation.41
Nonetheless, there are some regions where considerable work 
remains to be done in reaching an agreement on sharing freshwater 
resources, particularly in Africa.
 
42  In such situations, the U.N. Water-
courses Convention may have a positive normative influence as seen 
in the Southern Africa Development Community Revised Protocol on 
Shared Watercourse Systems (“SADC Protocol”)43 that significantly re-
vised the original 1995 protocol in order to harmonize the agreement 
with the U.N. Watercourses Convention.44
There are at least fifteen international rivers in the SADC region, 
which is among the world’s most water-scarce regions.
   
45  The SADC 
Protocol is an example of a significant water agreement that seeks to 
safeguard water supplies in a region where two-thirds of the surface 
water is shared by two or more states, and where population growth 
and climate change are putting significant pressures on water availa-
bility.46  Given this and other similar practices, Rieu-Clarke and 
Loures have commented that “even though not yet in force, the 
[U.N.] Watercourses Convention has been, at least to some degree, 
performing one of its key functions as a framework instrument—that 
of informing inter-State negotiations on watercourse agreements.”47
 
 38. Rieu-Clarke & Loures, supra note 
 
31, at 189. 
 39. Aaron T. Wolf et al., International River Basins of the World, 15 INT’L J. WATER 
RESOURCES DEV. 387, 391 (1999); Rieu-Clarke & Loures, supra note 31, at 189. 
 40. Rieu-Clarke & Loures, supra note 31, at 189 & n.52. 
 41. Fleur Johns et al., Law and the Mekong River Basin: A Socio-Legal Research Agenda on 
the Role of Hard and Soft Law in Regulating Transboundary Water Resources, 11 MELB. J. INT’L L. 
1, 2 (2010). 
 42. See Rieu-Clarke & Loures, supra note 31, at 187 (noting that most African basins are 
without equitable use or environmental protection agreements). 
 43. Revised Protocol on Shared Watercourses in the Southern African Development 
Community (“SADC”), Aug. 7, 2000, 40 I.L.M. 321. 
 44. Salman M. A. Salman, Legal Regime for Use and Protection of International Watercourses 
in the Southern African Region: Evolution and Context, 41 NAT. RESOURCES J. 981, 1004–05 
(2001). 
 45. ASHOK SWAIN, MANAGING WATER CONFLICT: ASIA, AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST 
140–42 (2004). 
 46. Id. at 153–54. 
 47. Rieu-Clarke & Loures, supra note 31, at 192. 
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There is incredulity in some quarters that the U.N. Watercourses 
Convention languishes while other multilateral environmental treaties 
attract widespread support (consider here the extensive adoption of 
instruments addressing marine pollution).48  Rieu-Clarke and Loures 
ask, for instance, why should “other global environmental issues . . . 
be afforded any greater priority than the current water crisis[?]”49  It is 
certainly true that water issues have not attracted the same level of in-
ternational attention as other environmental challenges.  Although 
there have been some important developments, including the focus 
on water in the Millennium Development Goals, it remains the case, 
as recently pointed out by the InterAction Council in its May 2011 
Communiqué, that “[i]nternational water leadership is virtually non-
existent.”50
Despite this, it is not at all clear that the U.N. Watercourses Con-
vention in its current form can be the primary vehicle for addressing 
the world’s water crisis.  The U.N. Watercourses Convention is by no 
means a comprehensive regime for freshwater in the same way as the 
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea
  
51 may be described as a “con-
stitution” of the seas, seeking to protect the oceanic commons for the 
benefit of humanity as a whole.52  The U.N. Watercourses Convention 
is not a constitution in form; it is flexible and able to be modified by 
states.53
 
 48. For discussion of the many widely supported pollution-control agreements adopted 
under the auspices of the International Maritime Organization, see DONALD R. ROTHWELL 
& TIM STEPHENS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA ch. 15 (2010). 
  Nor is it a constitution in substantive content; its scope is li-
 49. Rieu-Clarke & Loures, supra note 31, at 193. 
 50. Final Communiqué, InterAction Council, 7, 29th annual plen. sess. (May 29–31, 
2011), available at http://interactioncouncil.org/final-communiqu-42.  The InterAction 
Council was established in 1983 and brings together former heads of government and 
heads of state to promote international cooperation in achieving peace and security, world 
economic revitalization, and universal ethical standards.  INTERACTION COUNCIL, 
www.interactioncouncil.org/about-us (last visited Oct. 17, 2011).  
 51. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994).   
 52. Id. at 397 (stating that the “ocean floor and the subsoil thereof . . . are the common 
heritage of mankind, the exploration and exploitation of which shall be carried out for the 
benefit of mankind as a whole, irrespective of the geographical location of States”). 
 53. Unlike the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, it does not prevail over other 
agreements with which it is incompatible.  Compare Agreement for the Implementation of 
the Provisions of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea of 10 December 
1982, Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks art. 3(1), Dec. 4, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 1542 (providing that the Law of the 
Sea applies to areas beyond national jurisdiction) with United Nations: Convention on the 
Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses art. 3, supra note 18 (pro-
viding that nothing in the U.N. Watercourses Convention “shall affect the rights or obliga-
tions of a watercourse State arising from agreements in force for it on the date on which it 
became a party to the present Convention”). 
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mited to fairly general and imprecise duties of cooperation.  It is con-
cerned with the equitable sharing of freshwater resources among 
states that already share those resources, and does not deal with meta-
questions of distributive justice.  As such, it differs significantly from 
the regimes applicable to global commons, such as the climate 
change regime54 and ozone depletion regime,55 or even the biodiversi-
ty regime.56  All of these are attempts to address structural issues of in-
tra- and inter-generational justice.57
In light of the attention given to other core elements of the glob-
al environment, it is remarkable that we lack a global regime for the 
fair allocation of freshwater resources.  As water will always find the 
lowest level, can we say the same of international water law?  Is it des-
tined to reflect the lowest common denominator, establishing few 
constraints on the agreements that states have already concluded or 
may in the future reach over shared watercourses?  Can it exercise any 
moderating influence upon power imbalances between riparian 
states, challenging agreements and practices that are unjust and do 
not address fundamental inequalities?  Above all, can we be bold 
enough to think that a truly international and universal water law can 
be reimagined to match the needs of the international community in 
the twenty-first century? 
  
III. A GLOBAL “COMMUNITY OF INTEREST” IN FRESHWATER RESOURCES? 
In the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case, the ICJ affirmed the “community 
of interest” concept,58 which is the idea that all riparians have com-
mon legal rights in a shared watercourse.59  This marked a departure 
from the previously ascendant notion of “limited territorial sovereign-
ty” that had been supported in much state practice and by key arbitral 
decisions.60
 
 54. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849; Conference of the Parties to the 
Framework Convention on Climate Change: Kyoto Protocol, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22.  
  
 55. United Nations: Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 
22, 1985, 26 I.L.M. 1516; United Nations: Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone 
Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1541. 
 56. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Jun. 3–14, 1992, 
31 I.L.M. 814. 
 57. Tim Stephens, Sustainability Discourses in International Courts: What Place for Global 
Justice?, in GLOBAL JUSTICE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 39, 42–44 (Duncan French 
ed., 2010). 
 58. Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 7, ¶ 85 
(Sept. 25). 
 59. SWAIN, supra note 45, at 163. 
 60. See Lake Lanoux Arbitration (Fr. v. Spain) 12 RIAA 285 (1957). 
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The limited territorial sovereignty doctrine holds that upstream 
users must have some regard for downstream riparians, but otherwise 
pays legal deference to their position of physical control of a shared 
water resource.61  It moderates the right of capture, so that it is not 
simply the case that any state with access to a surface or subsurface wa-
ter resource may exploit it without regard for other users.62  The 
“community of interest” approach goes further, not only connoting 
“unilateral restraint,” but evoking “shared governance, joint action.”63
McCaffrey has endeavored to take the “community of interest” 
idea even further than its application to a particular basin and has 
called for freshwater resources to be shared equitably among all na-
tions, having special regard for those that are hydrologically disadvan-
taged.
 
64  Implicit in McCaffrey’s argument is that a system for the 
global allocation of water should be based on meeting minimum re-
quirements of distributive justice.65  It is not necessary for all individu-
als to have access to an equal share of water—there is no aim for abso-
lute perfection in distribution.66  There should, however, be some 
leveling out of the most egregious inequalities, so that hydrologically 
disadvantaged states are given a legal interest in the global hydrologic 
cycle and made the beneficiaries of an international mechanism to 
provide water to meet fundamental human needs.67
The obvious obstacle to achieving a fair global sharing of fresh-
water is a physical one.  Equitable management of the public goods 
provided by some commons can be addressed through obligations of 
restraint—for instance, a stable climate depends upon states refrain-
ing from polluting the atmosphere with greenhouse gases, and simi-
larly, yields of fish stocks upon which fishing states depend may be 
preserved by setting appropriate catch limits.  By contrast, a truly 
global common heritage regime for distributing freshwater would in-
volve moving water across significant distances and not simply ad-
dressing shortages within particular transboundary basins, an objec-
 
 
 61. MCCAFFREY, supra note 15, at 135–36. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 165. 
 64. Id. at 168–69. 
 65. For a justification of the turn to distributive justice in relation to global environ-
mental goods, see RICHARD P. HISKES, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO A GREEN FUTURE: 
ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS AND INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE 1–2 (2009) (arguing that all 
people should have equal access to air, water, and soil, implicit in their rights as citizens); 
see also THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 18–19 
(1995) (discussing and providing a critical analysis of the distributive justice theory). 
 66. MCCAFFREY, supra note 15, at 412 (noting that “[e]quity does not mean equality” 
when considering water access). 
 67. Id. at 169. 
2011] REIMAGINING INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW 29 
tive that can often be achieved by limiting upstream use in order to 
satisfy downstream needs.68  The fluidity of water belies the fact that it 
is a heavy and bulky commodity.69  The history of constructing canals 
and other structures to move water stretches back as far as ancient 
Mesopotamia.70  Recent technological advances have made seemingly 
unimaginable engineering feats possible, as illustrated by the mo-
mentous Lesotho Highlands Water Project, one of the largest infra-
structure projects in Africa.71  Many potential water projects, such as 
the populist calls in Australia to turn rivers inland, however,72 are lit-
erally pipe dreams because they are costly, energy intensive, and have 
a range of environmental, social, and cultural impacts.  Hence, while 
it is true that some valuable liquids (such as oil and liquid natural gas) 
are transported vast distances, it is in most cases uneconomical to do 
so for water, given the volumes involved.73
For this reason, there is a need to think laterally about the ways 
in which water scarcity can be addressed other than by moving water 
itself.  McCaffrey has contended that assistance to hydrologically dis-
advantaged states could take various forms, and “would not necessari-
ly entail provision of water, per se.”
   
74  Although McCaffrey does not 
specify what this “assistance” would be, there are conceivable possibili-
ties: transferring technology and expertise to manage existing water 
resources more sustainably; financing construction of water-saving in-
frastructure, such as replacing open channels with piped systems; or 
even funding and providing experts to construct desalination plants 
for parched coastal states.  If water law were to recognize these forms 
of assistance, then it would not be breaking new ground in interna-
tional environmental law given the plethora of environmental re-
gimes addressing financing and technology transfer in aid of sustain-
able development.75
There are two interrelated developments that underscore the 
need for the common heritage water ethic that McCaffrey advocates, 
 
 
 68. Id. at 410–11. 
 69. Falkenmark & Lundqvist, supra note 8, at 204. 
 70. WATER ENCYCLOPEDIA, IRRIGATION SYSTEMS, ANCIENT, www.waterencyclopedia. 
com/HY-La/Irrigation-Systems-Ancient.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2011).  
 71. LESOTHO HIGHLANDS WATER PROJECT, http://www.lhwp.org.ls/overview/default. 
htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2011). 
 72. Austl. Dept. of Sustainability, Env., Water, Population and Communities, Water for 
the Future: Moving Water Long Distances: Grand Schemes or Pipe Dreams? (2010). 
 73. It has occurred from time to time to satisfy human needs, as was the case in 2008 
when a tanker delivered freshwater to Barcelona, see Graham Keeley, Barcelona Forced to Im-
port Emergency Water, GUARDIAN, May 14, 2008, at 16. 
 74. MCCAFFREY, supra note 15, at 169.  
 75. See, e.g., United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change art. 4(3), May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849. 
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in which water itself may be moved from areas of greatest supply to 
areas of greatest need.  The first and most significant of these is hu-
man-induced climate change that requires legal changes to keep pace 
with changes to the hydrosphere.76  The second development is the 
phenomenon of “virtual water,” that is, the international trade in wa-
ter-intensive products, the effect of which is to transfer water re-
sources between states in a way that limits the capacity of exporting 
states to sustainably manage their water resources and be in a position 
to adapt to changing hydrological conditions.77
IV. GLOBAL WARMING AND CHANGES TO THE HYDROLOGICAL CYCLE  
  
There is improved understanding of the likely impacts of climate 
change on water availability worldwide, although much remains un-
known about specific impacts on particular regions and basins.  In re-
lation to water, the central messages of the Fourth Assessment Report 
(“AR4”) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) 
are that as temperatures increase there will be increased water availa-
bility in the moist tropics and high latitudes; however, there will also 
be decreasing water availability and increasing drought in mid-
latitudes and semi-arid low latitudes (see Figures 1 and 2 below).78
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 76. See infra Part IV. 
 77. See infra Part V; see also A. K. Chapagain & A. Y. Hoekstra, UNESCO-IHE, Water 
Footprints of Nations, in VALUE OF WATER RESEARCH REPORT SERIES NO. 16, 9 (2004) (“Vir-
tual water is defined as the volume of water required to produce a commodity or ser-
vice.”); Anil Ananthaswamy, Land-Grab Strategy Doesn’t Hold Water, NEW SCIENTIST, May 28, 
2011, at 10 (noting that importing food is “equivalent to importing ‘virtual water’”). 
 78. See Sanderson supra note 6, at 94.  
The increases in precipitation seen at higher latitudes are a result of increasing 
amounts of water vapour in the atmosphere.  Warmer temperatures result in 
higher evaporation rates, and warmer air can hold more water vapour.  There is 
also an increasing poleward transport of water vapour from lower latitudes.  The 
subtropical regions . . . experience a drying . . . . 
Id. 
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Figure 1. Relative Changes in Precipitation in 2090–99 Compared to 
1980–99 
 
Source: IPCC Fourth Assessment Report, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis 
Report, Figure 3.3.  Relative changes in precipitation (in percent) for the pe-
riod 2090-2099, relative to 1980-1999.  Values are multi-model averages 
based on the SRES A1B scenario for December to February (left) and June to 
August (right).  White areas are where less than 66% of the models agree in 
the sign of the change and stippled areas are where more than 90% of the 
models agree in the sign of the change. 
 
Figure 2. Projections of Relative Changes in Runoff by 2100 
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Source: IPCC Fourth Assessment Report, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis 
Report, Figure 3.5, Large-scale relative changes in annual runoff (water 
availability, in percent) for the period 2090-2099, relative to 1980-1999.  
Values represent the median of twelve climate models using the SRES A1B sce-
nario.  White areas are where less than 66% of the twelve models agree on the 
sign of change and hatched areas are where more than 90% of models agree on 
the sign of change.  The quality of the simulation of the observed large-scale 
twentieth century runoff is used as a basis for selecting the twelve models from 
the multi-model ensemble.  
 
The decrease in river runoff and water availability will worsen the 
trend of declining water availability already being experienced in 
places such as the Mediterranean Basin, western United States, north-
ern Africa, southern Africa, northeastern Brazil, and southern Aus-
tralia.79  Northern Africa appears likely to be hardest hit.80  This is of 
utmost concern given that states in the subtropical climatic zone are 
already experiencing high and in some cases unmanageable levels of 
water stress.  According to a recent risk assessment by Maplecroft, all 
of the sixteen nations that currently endure extreme levels of water 
stress are found in North Africa and the Middle East.81  Changing pat-
terns of water availability will in turn have impacts on food availability 
as agriculture is affected, with yields of crops in some places in sub-
Saharan Africa likely to decline by up to eighty-seven percent by the 
end of the century.82
The picture, however, is a complex one, and it depends on the 
scale and rate of climate change and population growth during this 
century and beyond.  Generally, as temperatures increase, drier areas 
will become drier and wetter areas will become wetter, and drier sea-
sons will become drier while wetter seasons will become wetter.
 
83
 
 79. Sanderson, supra note 
  
6, at 96; JOSEPH ALCAMO ET AL., CENTER FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEMS RESEARCH, UNIVERSITY OF KASSEL, WATER AND CLIMATE: A 
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE, KASSEL WORLD WATER SER. REP. NO. 6 at 2, 8 (Mar. 2003), available 
at http://www.usf.uni-kassel.de/ftp/dokumente/kwws/kwws.6.pdf. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Maplecroft Index Identifies Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia as World’s Most Wa-
ter Stressed Countries, MAPLECROFT (May 25, 2011), 
http://www.maplecroft.com/about/news/water_stress_index.html (last visited Sept. 11, 
2011).  The top ten are in descending order: Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Libya, 
Western Sahara, Yemen, Israel, Egypt, Dijbouti, and Jordan.  Id.  Water stress is deter-
mined by calculating the ratio of total water use (domestic, industrial, and agricultural 
use) to renewable water supplies (from precipitation, rivers, and groundwater).  Id.  
 82. Philip K. Thornton et al., Agriculture and Food Systems in Sub-Saharan Africa in a 4˚C 
World, 369 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL SOC’Y A 117, 122 (2011). 
 83. Fai Fung et al, Water Availability in +2˚C and +4˚C Worlds , 369 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS 
OF THE ROYAL SOC’Y A 99, 110–11(2011). 
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Once population growth is factored in, the majority of the world’s 112 
river basins will suffer higher levels of stress if temperatures rise 4˚C 
or more.84  Some basins such as the Nile and the Murray Darling ap-
pear likely to be very hard hit under all climate and population scena-
rios, while others such as the Ganges may benefit from increased ru-
noff in a +4˚C world, even offsetting demand from increasing 
population.85  Moreover, the hydrological cycle will intensify, increas-
ing the proportion of the world’s flood-prone populations threatened 
by flood hazards by up to fifty percent.86
What is certain is that there will be substantial changes to water 
availability beyond natural variability that will challenge the assump-
tions upon which many water agreements have been built.  The ques-
tion then becomes how can international water law assist states in 
adapting to changing hydrological conditions.  Regrettably the U.N. 
Watercourses Convention provides limited assistance in its current 
form.  As has been noted, it does not seek to achieve an equitable dis-
tribution of water resources in global terms.  Conceivably, however, 
the Convention, being a framework convention, could be augmented 
by a protocol specifically designed to address water scarcity brought 
aboutcaused by climate change.  
  
Nor does the Convention provide a clear basis for including cli-
mate change issues in negotiations on new water agreements, let 
alone as a basis for renegotiating existing agreements.  The Conven-
tion itself does not refer to climate change, which is surprising given 
that it was concluded well after the phenomenon of anthropogenic 
global warming had attracted international concern following the 
IPCC’s First Assessment Report in 1990.  Although Article 6(1)(a) of 
the Convention refers to “climatic” and “other factors of a natural” 
character as being relevant to determining what is equitable and rea-
sonable utilization,87 human-induced climate change is not a “natural” 
factor.  Hence climate change’s impacts upon a freshwater system 
would need to be addressed via a related consideration, such as the 
reference in Article 6(1)(b) to the “social and economic needs of the 
watercourse States concerned.”88
 
 84. Id. at 112. 
  
 85. Id.  
 86. Nigel Arnell, Beyond 4˚ C: Impacts Across the Global Scale  (Sept. 2009), available at 
www.eci.ox.ac.uk/4degrees/ppt/1-3arnell.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2011). 
 87. Rep. of the Comm. to the Gen. Assembly on the Work of Its 46th Sess., 1994, 49 
GAOR Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (1996). 
 88. Significantly, climate change is not mentioned in the commentaries to the ILC’s 
Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses Text 
adopted by the International Law Commission at its forty-sixth session in 1994, which was 
submitted to the General Assembly as a part of the Commission’s report covering the work 
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Moreover the Convention does not provide a basis for renegotiat-
ing existing agreements, even if they produce inequitable outcomes 
under changing climatic conditions.  This is because the Convention 
supplements rather than supplants existing agreements.  Article 3(1) 
provides that in the absence of a contrary agreement, nothing in the 
Convention shall affect the rights or obligations of a watercourse state 
arising from agreements in force.89  Under Article 3(2) parties are 
urged to consider harmonizing existing agreements with the basic 
principles of the Convention.90  Furthermore, Article 3(3) provides 
that watercourse states may enter into agreements that adjust the pro-
visions of the Convention to meet the particular characteristics and 
uses of a specific watercourse.91
The incapacity of the central framework for international water 
law to assist states in addressing climate change is of significant con-
cern because at general international law, states have few options 
available to them to seek adjustment to existing water agreements. 
One option is the termination of a water agreement; however, the 
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case suggests that the circumstances in which this 
is possible are limited.
  
92  In that case the ICJ rejected Hungary’s ar-
gument that it was entitled to terminate a river agreement with Slova-
kia on the grounds of impossibility of performance or a fundamental 
change in circumstances as a result of “the progress of environmental 
knowledge and the development of new norms and prescriptions of 
international environmental law.”93  The factual basis of Hungary’s 
argument was that the joint dams project threatened the riverine en-
vironment of the Danube.94
The court applied Articles 61 and 62 of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties, which deal, respectively, with treaty termina-
tion for reasons of supervening impossibility of performance and 
fundamental change of circumstances.
  
95
 
of that session.  Id. ¶ 222.  Nor is climate change mentioned in the ILC’s Draft Articles on 
the Law of Transboundary Aquifers.  Several footnotes in the Commentaries briefly re-
ferred to it, but not in any substantive way.  Id. 
  In relation to impossibility of 
performance, the court held that the essential object of the bilateral 
 89. United Nations: Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of Interna-
tional Watercourses, May 21, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 700 (1997). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. The Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 7, 
¶ 104 (Sept. 25). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. ¶¶ 53–56. 
 95. Id. ¶¶ 102–04; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331. 
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river agreement had not disappeared or been destroyed, and that the 
agreement actually permitted any necessary readjustments to take in-
to account ecological imperatives.96
In relation to the fundamental change of circumstances, which 
Hungary said was caused by profound political changes, the diminish-
ing economic viability of the project, improved environmental know-
ledge, and new environmental norms, the court responded that:  
  
The changed circumstances advanced by Hungary are, in 
the Court’s view, not of such a nature, either individually or 
collectively, that their effect would radically transform the 
extent of the obligations still to be performed in order to ac-
complish the Project.  A fundamental change of circums-
tances must have been unforeseen; the existence of the cir-
cumstances at the time of the Treaty’s conclusion must have 
constituted an essential basis of the consent of the parties to 
be bound by the Treaty.  The negative and conditional word-
ing of Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties is a clear indication moreover that the stability of 
treaty relations requires that the plea of fundamental 
change of circumstances be applied only in exceptional cas-
es.97
The ILC in its Commentaries on the Articles on Treaties that 
formed the basis of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties re-
ferred to “the type of cases envisaged by [Article 61] is the submer-
gence of an island, the drying up of a river or the destruction of a 
dam or hydro-electric installation indispensable for the execution of a 
treaty.”
 
98
As for fundamental change of circumstances, there has been 
some consideration of this issue in the context of the effect of rising 
sea levels upon baselines, and maritime zones projected from them, 
and maritime boundary agreements,
  This would suggest that only the complete and permanent 
drying up of a river would allow a state to terminate a water treaty.  
99
 
 96. The Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. ¶ 103. 
 but not in the context of water 
agreements.  An application of the reasoning of the ICJ in the 
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case suggests that because climate change has 
been of international concern since at least 1990, when the IPCC re-
leased its first assessment report, it could not be used as a justification 
 97. Id. ¶ 104. 
 98. 1966 U.N. Int’l Law Comm’n Y.B. 256, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.1.; 
ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 296–97 (2d ed. 2007). 
 99. Article 62(2) expressly provides that a fundamental change of circumstances may 
not be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty.  1966 U.N. Int’l 
Law Comm’n Y.B. 261, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.1. 
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for suspending or terminating a treaty, except in certain cases where 
the impact on a particular basin was completely unforeseen.  
Even if Article 61 or 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties applies, suspension or termination may not be helpful reme-
dies.  This is because the articles allow states to withdraw from the re-
levant regime entirely, potentially leaving no available mechanism 
such as a river commission through which to fashion an agreed re-
sponse to changing conditions.100
What would clearly be preferable is an overarching requirement 
to renegotiate a regime that meets a specified international standard, 
in a manner akin to the approach of the Straddling Stocks Agree-
ment, which requires states to bring regional fisheries management 
organizations in line with a regime which includes a range of state of 
the art features, including a precautionary approach.
  The relevant states would therefore 
be relieved of their treaty obligations under the applicable river re-
gime, and be bound only by those of the U.N. Watercourses Conven-
tion (if they were parties to it) or those obligations under customary 
international law.  
101  In practice, 
however, it may well be that many existing regimes can be successfully 
adapted.  Although many international water allocation regimes are 
highly inflexible102—and these should be the targets of a framework 
agreement for equitable freshwater distribution—other subsystem or 
basin-wide agreements do include some provision for responding to 
changes, such as natural variability in river flows.103
V.  GLOBALIZATION AND VIRTUAL WATER TRADING 
 
The phenomenon of “virtual water” trading is a further devel-
opment that underscores the need for international water law to be 
reimagined to address hydrological scarcity.  Each year, food produc-
tion uses around eighty percent of available freshwater worldwide; wa-
ter is effectively embedded in agricultural products that are traded in-
ternationally.104
 
 100. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 61, 62, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331. 
  This virtual trade in water is increasing, and states 
 101. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.  
 102. A. Dan Tarlock, How Well Can International Water Allocation Regimes Adapt to Global 
Climate Change?, 15 J. LAND USE & TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. L. 423, 429 (2000). 
 103. See Alena Drieschova & Itay Fischhendler, A Toolkit of Mechanisms to Reduce Un-
certainty in International Water Treaties 19, http://internationalwaterlaw.org/bibliogra-
phy/articles/general/Tookit-Uncertainty_in_International_Water_Treaties.pdf, (describ-
ing an open-ended approach to deal with uncertainties, such as an agreement that may 
include “the option of the sequential construction of regimes over time rather than im-
mediate finalization”). 
 104. See Ananthaswamy, supra note 77, at 10.  
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that rely on large imports of food are also in essence importing the 
water required to produce this product.105  This is a transfer of water 
other than via the physical movement of water itself, of the kind 
McCaffrey alluded to and discussed as a possible response to water 
scarcity.  This process of globalization of water, however, is a process 
driven not by any overarching framework to address inequality, but 
rather by a harsh economic logic responding to demographic and en-
vironmental change.106
A key dimension of this virtual trade in water is that some states 
facing food security issues are seeking to entrench virtual water trad-
ing relationships through what is widely termed a “land grab,” espe-
cially in Africa.
  
107  To this end, states such as China, India, Korea, and 
the Gulf States have leased large tracts of agricultural land in sub-
Saharan countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Ethiopia, and Kenya.108  For example, Saudi Arabia has scaled back lo-
cal production of wheat because of the pressure this places on its 
aquifers and has instead leased around 380,000 hectares of land in 
Sudan to grow wheat and rice.109  This phenomenon is concentrated 
in states in the global South, but is not taking place exclusively in de-
veloping nations.  For instance, the Qatar government’s sovereign 
wealth fund is investing heavily in prime pastoral land in Australia, 
while the Australian government is considering whether to place lim-
its on foreign acquisition of rural land.110
D’Odorico and his co-authors have noted that the effect of the 
virtual water trade is to allow societies with the financial capacity to 
import food to exceed their “local water budget.”
  
111  D’Odorico and 
his co-authors have also noted that this practice has significant short-
term benefits, allowing societies to address pressing problems such as 
famine, and can be used from time to time to address threats that 
could, in the worst case scenario, involve armed conflict.112
 
 105. Id. 
  They note 
 106. See id. (noting that in 2000, five percent of the “worldwide water flow was chan-
neled through just one link between two ‘rich club’ members—the US and Japan”). 
 107. Id.  
 108. Maplecroft Index Identifies Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia as World’s Most Wa-
ter Stressed Countries, supra note 81. 
 109. Ananthaswamy, supra note 77, at 10.  
 110. Cameron Houston & Royce Millar, Qatar Land Grab Angers Bush, THE AGE, (June 
19, 2011), http://www.theage.com/au/victoria/qatar-land-grab-angers-bush-20110618-
1g99l.html.   
 111. Paolo D’Odorico et al., Does Globalisation of Water Reduce Societal Resilience to 
Drought?, 37 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS L13403, ¶ 1 (2010). 
 112. Id. 
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that “[t]he trade and transport of virtual water appears to be a great 
remedy to short term local water deficit.”113
Left unconstrained, however, the globalization of water in the 
long term may generate severe structural problems and drive an allo-
cation of water directly in conflict with a unified, distributively fair wa-
ter ethic, particularly under the effects of climate change.  First, it will 
support population growth in areas that are water poor, and make 
these areas highly dependent on the flow of virtual water from areas 
that are water rich.  This has the effect of disconnecting societies from 
the food production systems and water resources that they rely upon.  
Second, it will reduce the capacity of societies in areas that are water 
rich to make decisions about their own water resources, and can pre-
vent them from taking appropriate steps to deal with phenomena 
such as droughts made more severe by climate change.  D’Odorico 
and his co-authors therefore advocate what they term “water solidari-
ty, whereby (1) long distance transport of food occurs mainly in times 
of crop failure and food shortage, and (2) it does not let the available 
resources exceed the carrying capacity that the region would have in 
periods with no drought.”
  
114
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
At the Rio+20 U.N. Conference on Sustainable Development in 
2012, global attention will be focused on the achievements and fail-
ures of global environmental governance in the twenty years since the 
U.N. Conference on Environment Development, and the manage-
ment of water is likely to be an issue front and center in the discus-
sions.  At the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, significant attention was given 
to issues of freshwater scarcity and the declining health of freshwater 
ecosystems worldwide.115  Water issues were addressed in detail in 
Agenda 21, the comprehensive plan of action to address global envi-
ronmental challenges.116  Showing remarkable prescience, Agenda 21 
recognized the potential impacts of climate change on water re-
sources, noting that the phenomenon was likely to put “strains on the 
already fragile balance between supply and demand in many coun-
tries.”117  It also set out an ambitious “overall objective . . . to satisfy the 
freshwater needs of all countries for their sustainable development.”118
 
 113. Id. ¶ 11. 
  
 114. Id. 
 115. U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June 
3–14, 1992, Agenda 21, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1.  
 116. Id.  
 117. Id. ¶ 18.82. 
 118. Id. ¶ 18.7. 
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Although it set a global goal, the specific activities and means of 
implementation identified in Agenda 21 were focused primarily on 
achieving integrated water resources management at the level of cat-
chment basins that fall within individual states or that are shared by 
several nations.119  Hence the Earth Summit did not set out a clear 
blueprint for addressing systemic problems of hydrological disadvan-
tage at a global scale.  Indeed the reference in Principle 2 of the Rio 
Declaration to the “sovereign right” of states “to exploit their own re-
sources pursuant to their own environmental and developmental pol-
icies”120
Given the growing proportion of the world’s population afflicted 
by water scarcity, McCaffrey’s argument that “the time has come to 
view fresh water in global terms”
 is in tension with a global water ethic based on principles of 
distributive justice.  
121 is more compelling than it has ever 
been.  McCaffrey freely acknowledged that translating this perspective 
into legal form is in no way a straightforward task.122  Progress is possi-
ble, however, if there is acceptance at a conceptual level that the 
supply of freshwater resources is a common concern of humankind 
and should be considered in global terms, even if the operationaliza-
tion of alleviating hydrological disadvantage will often need to be 
played out on a much more localized scale.123
To some extent the incorporation of concerns of global justice 
within international water law is foreshadowed by the Millennium De-
velopment Goals and also by U.N. General Assembly Resolution 
64/292 in 2010, which recognized “the right to safe and clean drink-
ing water and sanitation as a human right that is essential for the full 
enjoyment of life and all human rights.”
  
124
 
 119. Id. ¶¶ 18.7–18.9. 
  These are limited steps to-
ward a reconceptualized international water law; however, as a rights-
based approach, they are based on an assumption that individual gov-
ernments or small groupings of states will be in a position to meet the 
water needs of their citizens.  In reality, the forces unleashed by cli-
mate change and by virtual water trading are placing the challenge of 
equitable water distribution beyond the capacity of individual gov-
ernments or basin states to achieve.  The U.N. Watercourses Conven-
tion provides valuable guidance on many issues critical to integrated 
 120. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janiero, 
Braz., June 3–14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), Annex I (Aug. 12, 1992). 
 121. MCCAFFREY, supra note 15, at 168. 
 122. “The concept of ‘equity’ or ‘equitable allocation’ should be applied to [uneven 
distribution of the world’s fresh water].  It will not be easy.”  Id. 
 123. Falkenmark & Lundqvist, supra note 8, at 209–10. 
 124. G.A. Res. 64/292, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc A/Res/64/292 (Aug. 3, 2010). 
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water management; however, it remains tethered to a conception of 
freshwater as a resource within sovereign control rather than as a 
commodity that is and must be a global public good.  As contended in 
this Article, nothing short of a fundamentally reimagined interna-
tional water law, accompanied by a system that can achieve directly or 
indirectly the transfer of water from areas of greatest supply to those 
of greatest need, is required if hydrological disadvantage is to be ef-
fectively addressed. 
